From the etymology of the term «border» we define the current definitions for our intelligence: «barrier detachment», «forest guard and reserve protection», «guard». Together with the actual designation of the line of demarcation of certain territories («border, boundary»), these definitions are based on two semantics – «demarcation» and «protection». That is, if we project on the current socio-political situation in Ukraine, we note the following analogies: the state border is not only a line of official demarcation of Ukraine and Russia (we are witnessing how easy it is to ignore this line to a state with much greater military potential), but also an element protection and fences. And this barrier is not so much in the military features (although this may be a defining aspect in certain historical periods – for example, in the late 17th century or early 20th), as in the spiritual and cultural in general.

The latter parameters are directly signs of the ethnic group, whose representatives should feel the common value systems as integral. That is, simply, an ethnic (national) hero – he must be a hero for all, and for whom he is not a hero, hence – «not ours» (in the plane of the traditional division of ethnic groups into «ours» and «not ours»). Finally, we will not analyze in detail the terms «ethnic group» and «nation» (in recent dictionary definitions, the latter is generally defined as having no ethnic nature – !? – ed.), Because we want to mention such a «fence on the border» as national language.

We define this aspect as pragmatic, because the purity of the language – its freedom from Russian-speaking strata – is currently one of the main tasks of the state (if, of course, it is interested in the status of ethnic / national unitary). We call this a «zone of state danger», which contains, for example, traced forms of direct codification (the city of «Yuznyi» – ukr. «Pivdenne», dessert «Chudo»– ukr. «Dyvo», the name «Nikita» – ukr. «Mykyta», surname «Kobzarˊ» – ukr. «Kobzar»), tracing of indirect codification («spir», «rozrobka», «u tomu chysli») and traced forms of potential codification («user» – «outsider», «prosunutyi rivenˊ» – spatial «prodvynutyi», «vantazhyty» – «moral pressure»). Such a zone for the state is also a border that needs to be protected.

Another «borderland» is due to historical circumstances, in particular for our country – or indigenous Ukrainian ethnic population (territory of Slavic tribes – west, north and center of Ukraine), or the Ukrainian dominant settlement of relatively new territories (south and east of Ukraine). Thus, based on the results of our research, it is possible to draw a conclusion about the quantitative dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the south before the beginning of mass settlement (colonization) of the region during this process – and to this day. At the same time, since the days of the empire, there are still negative factors for Ukrainian statehood – the functioning of the Russian language in informal / everyday communication in the city, which is associated with the colonial syndrome of ethnic inferiority, formed through politics, media, education and culture. This is a crutial loophole in the continuous ethno-social border for the imperial forces. Its basic part remains unchanged – the dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic conglomerate, which includes the age-old complex of spiritual / genetic values [1]. For a hundred years, the linguistic and ethnic situation has fundamentally changed only in cities, remaining unchanged in rural areas and in the region as a whole. This is determined by scientific analysis, while attempts to intervene in favor of certain political forces remained in vain, affecting only the urban society.

In the question of the demarcation of our ethnic groups, Russian propaganda stands for the commonality of such a past, but a clear demarcation from the same imperial scholars in the 19th century (including O. Potebnia or O. Shakhmatov) of these tribes to those who formed the basis of the Ukrainian ethnic group (Polyany, Derevlyany, Severyany, Duliby, White Croats, etc.) and which formed the basis of the Russians and Belarusians (Dregovychi, Kryvychi, Vyatychi, etc.) indicate the opposite. From this we see how much historical logic is traditionally inferior to historical mythology.

Closely related to this is the third «borderland» – mental, which involves not only psychological stereotypes, but also a set of spiritual values, which includes the attitude to the host of heroes who are heroes for all members of the ethnic group, and elements of ethnic / national self-identification, which are primarily based on the previous historical component. That is, it should be a purely positive attitude towards one's ethnic group and everything connected with it. As a reverse example, let us cite the Russian-Soviet perception of its heroes, who, in accordance with the imperial character of the state, are its leaders (that is, they are the heroes, yet all other politicians are traditionally perceived negatively). These are medieval princes who a priori (at that time an integral attribute of domination) were associated with the numerous deaths of their subordinates. Especially strange in this case are the cases of canonization of some of them. Here – the definition of Emperor Peter I as the builder of «Greater Russia» – despite the extermination of tens of thousands of Russians and unmotivated damage to nature. Or the popular perception of Joseph Stalin as the «creator of the great victory», which overshadows the real facts of the destruction of hundreds of thousands of people, the deportation, which took place largely under the influence of his personal emotions and reflections.

On the other hand – Ukrainian heroes, who are necessarily perceived by the empire and its ideologues and adherents categorically negatively (Ivan Mazepa, Simon Petliura, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, etc.). Taras Shevchenko was perceived similarly, and at the highest level of the monarchy – by Emperor Nicholas himself, and only the possibility of using many fragments of his poetry in Soviet ideology (anti-monarchical, anti-religious) left the artist's achievements fully accessible throughout Soviet history. These issues are actively studied by Ukrainian science, and a modern young scientist (and not young, because as long as you live – so much you learn) should be acquainted with the views of Eugene Malanyuk, Mykola Khvylovyi, Pavlo Shtepa [2], which in Soviet times exposed its hypocrisy and danger for the identity of Ukrainians and other «non-state» ethnic groups, urging Ukrainians not to get closer to Russians than to avoid the threat of assimilation (as has happened for half a century with millions of Ukrainians, the majority in Kursk, Voronezh, Belgorod, Minsk in Donetsk and Luhansk). Modern scholars (say, Bohdan Azhniuk, Larysa Masenko [3], Halyna Mohylnytska [4]) analyze the situation with ethnic identity in accordance with the social changes that took place during the time of independent Ukraine, when a new Ukrainian ethnic / national formation was formed.

Thus, the state border is not only the line of official delimitation of the territories of the two countries (for us it is relevant – Ukraine and Russia), but also an element of real protection, simply «fence». Unfortunately, the internationally declared borders of the state are in fact not so inviolable that in history it was shown on the examples of the German aggression of 1939 and the Russian aggression of 2014, which concern certain territories of Ukraine). Such aggression occurs not only in the military dimension, but also in the ethno-spiritual dimension. That is why this factor is perhaps crucial in such circumstances.