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The article is devoted to the study of modern corporate governance and the use of lobbying as its tool. The relevance of the research topic is due to the tendencies to the active use by managers and shareholders of corporations of means of influencing the market and government institutions.

The issue of using lobbying as a tool to realize the interests of individuals, their groups or organizations has already been reflected in the publications of domestic and foreign scholars. In particular, such researchers as V. Bezkorovainy, O. Grosfeld, O. Diaghilev, D. Kislov, A. Bentley, L. Zetter, W. Paterson, C. Walker and others paid attention to it. The author, who owns several dozen thematic publications, including a monographic format, did not stay away from considering this topic [2].

The basis for this study were also some ideas, developments of researchers on the development of corporate governance, such as: I. Ansoff, S. Pishpek, O. Povazhny, V. Yevtushevsky, R. Kapelyushnikov, D. Zadykhailo, G. Kozachenko, N. Karachina , F. Lopez, V. Ya. Nusinov, T. Peters, D. Kay, A. Silberston, A. Schleifer, A. Cadbury, C. Mallin, G. Shailer.

However, the existing tendencies to intensify the use of lobbying in various spheres of public relations and the fragmentary nature of existing research on its role as a management tool, determine the relevance of new research in this area.

The aim of the article is to study the features of the use of lobbying as a tool of corporate governance in modern conditions.

In the course of the research the author generalized the views of numerous domestic and foreign researchers on the nature of corporate governance and the peculiarities of its regulation. The author takes into account the research of consulting and analytical companies, which show that shareholders and investors tend to attach high importance to effective management of the company, and at the same time - put pressure on management to achieve high financial and economic performance in the short term, even at strategic loss. It is noted that the psychology of investing is a special category of knowledge. The role of subjectivity of perception is emphasized, which causes inadequate response of shareholders to internal and external factors, if the information about them was distorted by the executive directors.

Based on a number of examples of state and interstate on corporate relations after the lobbying, the author notes the dynamics of increasing the tendency of corporate and shareholder management to use lobbying and other questionable tools for redistribution of corporate property. The regularities of the use of lobbying and other instruments of influence by managers and majority shareholders are highlighted.

Particular attention is paid to the importance of further research on the regulation of lobbying, in order to limit its abuse in the context of corporate governance. The author emphasizes the need to develop appropriate tools.

corporate governance; corporate governance models; chief executive officers; shareholders; goodwill; lobbying; abuse of power, corruption